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Commoditizing Intellectual Property Rights: The
Practicability of a Commercialized and Transparent
International IPR Market and the Need for
International Standards
IAN DAVID MCCLUREt
In a small recording studio in New York on January 15, 1965, Nina
Simone sang the unforgettable lyrics to the song titled "Feeling Good": "It's
a new dawn, it's a new day, it's a new life for me, and I'm feeling good."'
It is safe to believe that the talented singer was not crooning about the
prospective outlook on intellectual property rights (IPRs). Nevertheless,
today the words bring new meaning to the current intellectual property
context. It is certainly a new dawn, a new day, and a new life for intellectual
property holders, and they should all be feeling good about it. IPRs,
inefficiently applied and arbitrarily valued potential money-earning assets,
are on the brink of becoming consistent and transparent articles of trade.
INTRODUCTION
We have always lived in a "knowledge society." Knowledge, or shared
information, is at the core of social capital and development. It has been "at
the heart of economic growth and the gradual rise in levels of social well-
being since time immemorial."'2 While the complexity and specialization of
shared information advances, the profound importance of knowledge will
never change. The creation of ideas, to be embodied in new products,
processes, devices, methods, and business strategies, however, is regarded
today with new urgency. Such urgency is not created by a reinvigorated
compulsion for social capital. Indeed, that need has never waned. Instead, it
is the economy, a newly coined "knowledge-based economy," 3 which
demands that such a premium be placed on invention and innovation. This
demand has been met with adequate supply. Yet, supply and demand are
t Wyatt, Tarrant, & Combs, LLP, Louisville, KY; J.D., Chapman University School of
Law; also the author of Copyright's Campaign for Property Rights and an Eminent
Consequence of Intellectual Monopoly, 10 CHAP. L. REv. 787 (2007). A special thanks to
Dean Jayne Kacer for many words of wisdom.
I The Nina Simone Web, Feeling Good, http://boscarol.com/nna/html/where/feeling
good.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
2 Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, Economic Fundamentals of the Knowledge
Society, 1 POL'Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 20, 20 (2003).
3 Id. ("'Knowledge-based economy' .. . is a recently coined term. As such, its use is
meant to signify a change from the economies of earlier periods ....").
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without a robust and transparent marketplace through which transactions
can be facilitated with optimal ease. This Article will discuss such a
marketplace, its legal and administrative viability, and whether existing
international legal agendas are ready to support this phenomenon.
Part I will discuss the characteristics of IPRs that enable them to
become freely transferable articles of trade. Specifically, intellectual
property regimes afford property rights to ideas, adding value to intangible
assets when recognized through a legal system. Free transferability and
legal mechanisms which protect the owner of an IPR instead of the creator
facilitate an arena that incentivizes the exchange of this value.
A "knowledge-based economy" has brought new suppliers of
intellectual property to the table. Nevertheless, increased public recognition
of the benefits posed by cross-market licensing and the exchange of IPRs as
a versatile and valuable commodity has created the need for an open market
for trading intangible rights. As costs increase for maintaining large
corporate intellectual property portfolios, and as new technology continues
to usurp its predecessors at an alarming rate, old and new rights holders
alike need to realize a quick return on their investments. Because of the
high transaction costs associated with finding potential buyers and
negotiating deals, a transparent and practical international marketplace is
advantageous.
Part II sheds light on the current wave of activity in the IPR market.
IPR auctions have attempted to commoditize IPRs and bring transparency
to the marketplace. Should auctions successfully construct a transparent
marketplace, new market participants may be induced to an opportunistic
trading forum that could have the equity groups and pension funds investing
in IPRs.
The feasibility of an open market for IPRs will be the focus of Part III.
A theoretical discussion of the legal implications will be followed by
considerations of the practical administration of a commoditized IPR
market. Emphasis will be placed on market transparency, buyer due
diligence, and IPR valuation.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article will attempt to explore the current
international system for regulating the trade of intellectual property. While
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS) and World Trade Organization (WTO) framework may
contemplate the exchange of goods and services encompassing IPRs, it does
not adequately provide for a market which will require a higher level of
standardization in the areas of antitrust protection and procedural and
administrative functions.
Lawmakers and intellectual property holders, worldwide, should begin
to embrace the idea of IPRs as a valuable and versatile article of trade. It is
not here yet, but it is coming...
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I. IPRS: REALIZING THE POTENTIAL TO REALIZE A GAIN ON CREATIVE
INVESTMENT
The concern with instilling an incentive to create is not new. Our
forward-looking Founding Fathers were quite aware of the significance of
new ideas in a flourishing economy. The Constitution reserves exclusive
rights to authors and inventors to "promote the progress of science and the
useful arts." 4 These rights were granted with the purpose that such
exclusivity and control would afford the creator an opportunity to be
rewarded, presumptively with money, for any costs incurred through the
creative process. In effect, it is the profit motive that becomes the incentive
to create, secured by legal protection of IPRs. Protectionists argue that
without legal protection, opportunistic creation cannot be assured.
Legislators across the international spectrum have taken heed to the
protectionist argument, affording virtual property rights to intangible ideas
in the form of substantial legal protection. 5 While the debate continues to
evolve around the optimal level of protection, 6 certain rights are granted to
the owner of an IPR. It is significant, here, to distinguish between the
creator of the intellectual property, and the owner of the government-
granted rights associated with that intellectual property, for they may not be
the same person. All rights which initially vest in the creator of intellectual
property may attach to a subsequent owner of that intellectual property,
whether by sale, license, assignment, or gift. The most important attributes
of those rights are (1) exclusivity of control over the intellectual property,
(2) free transferability of one or all rights, and (3) the ability of the owner to
set a price for the license to use, or the ownership of, those rights.
7
A. Exclusivity of Exploitation is the Paramount Principle of Intellectual
Property Ownership
The importance of exclusive control over an idea is extracted from a
theory not too far from Locke's Labor Theory, 8 which creates the
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5 Alden F. Abbott, Assoc. Dir. Policy & Coordination, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at
the APEC High-Level Symposium on IPR in Xiamen, People's Republic of China: The
Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy (Sept. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/abbottipchina.pdf ("Intellectual
Property ... is a highly valued asset, and it has been granted substantial legal protection by
the nations of the world.").
6 Id. ("Given the importance of intellectual property in fostering economic progress,
one might wonder whether our economies might progress even faster if intellectual property
was more freely available for others to use and build upon-i.e., treated more like a public
good than private property. I believe the correct answer is 'No."').
7 Id.
8 JoHfN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
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assumption that by mixing our labor with something, we make that thing
our own. Fundamentally, "[i]deas and expressions and inventions are all the
product of mixing our labor, in this case our mental labor, with the common
property of preexisting ideas and information." 9 In essence, a government-
granted monopoly l° is endowed to the rights owner for all prospective
opportunities to manage that idea. Such control exists through legal
positivism only; it exists if and only to the extent that it is recognized by
law. As one professor explains:
Intellectually or artistically gifted people have the right to prevent the
unauthorized use or sale of their creations, just the same as owners of
physical property, such as cars, buildings, and stores. Yet, compared to
makers of chairs, refrigerators, and other tangible goods, people whose
work is essentially intangible face more difficulties in earning a living
if their claim to their creations is not respected. Artists, authors,
inventors, and others unable to rely on locks and fences to protect their
work turn to IP rights to keep others from harvesting the fruits of their
labor.1
Generally, economists argue that this practice artificially creates
intellectual scarcities. 12 Yet, the legal allocation of intellectual property
rights does not attempt to confer a right of exclusive possession of
information-goods unless they are kept completely secret. 13 Unless
intellectual property is created to be utilized for internal benefit only, such
as a trade secret, secrecy would be inefficient behavior for any rational,
profit-maximizing intellectual property creator. Instead, disclosure is
incentivized because the right to exploit an idea is given value in a
"knowledge-based economy." Therefore, the right of exclusivity is the
distinct right of beneficial economic exploitation. 14 "This device allows the
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his.").
9 Jim Harper, Dir. of Info. Policy Studies, Cato Inst., Remarks at the Cato Institute
Conference on Copyright Controversies: Freedom, Property, Content Creation, and the
DMCA (Apr. 26, 2006), in CATO POL'Y REP., July/Aug. 2006, at 15.
10 Jesse Walker, How Intellectual Property Laws Stifle Popular Culture, REASON, Mar.
2000, http://www.reason.com/news/show/27635.html.
I I Thomas G. Field Jr., What is Intellectual Property?, in Focus ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2, at 2-3 (2006),
available at http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/iprbook.pdf
12 See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Economic and Game Theory: Property
Rights and Intellectual Monopoly, http://www.dklevine.com/general/intellectual/coffee.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
13 David & Foray, supra note 2, at 38 ("Indeed, to claim a right of possession one must
be able to describe the thing that is owned, but no sooner do you describe your idea to
another person than their mind comes into (non-exclusive) possession of it ....").
14 Id. ("What the creation and assigning intellectual property rights does... is to convey
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organisation of market exchanges of 'exploitation rights,' which, by
assigning pecuniary value to commercially exploitable ideas, creates
economic incentives for people to go on creating new ones, as well as
finding new applications for old ones."
' 15
B. The Free Transferability of an IPR Supplements the Exclusive
Exploitation Right, Providing an Open Channel for Efficient and
Profitable Exchange
The inherent characteristics of intellectual property tell us that it
cannot be an efficient article of trade. Knowledge "certainly does not
resemble conventional commodities of the sort that are widely traded in
markets." 1 6 Indeed, physical property and intellectual property are different
"properties."
Physical property is a rivalrous and scarce resource, which adds to its
intrinsic worth. Furthermore, property rights in tangible goods, from an
economics perspective, help facilitate efficient transactional interaction "in
the context of scarcity."' 17 Without such property rights, transaction costs
would be extremely high because resources such as time and energy would
be spent ensuring exclusive possession and protection.
Intellectual property is a non-rivalrous good: An idea and its
expression can be used concurrently, by more than one person, and
repeatedly without being thereby depleted.' 8 Therefore, without more, there
is no real private commercial value to be captured in a new idea.
Marketable value is only added when exclusive rights to exploit that idea or
expression are conferred by a legal regime. This tells us that the commercial
value is actually in the rights to control intellectual property, and not in the
intellect itself. 19
The benefit of the free transferability of IPRs, then, means the benefit
of the unrestrained exchange of the rights to exploit an idea or its
expression, and not of exchange of the idea itself. The right to freely
a monopoly right to the beneficial economic exploitation of an idea (in the case of patent
rights) or of a particular expression of an idea (in the case of copyright) that has been
disclosed, rather than being kept secret.").
15 Id.
16 Id. at 37.
17 Harper, supra note 9 ("If I have an apple and you want to eat it too, we can't both eat
it without bumping our faces together and making quite a mess. In economic parlance, an
apple is a rivalrous physical good. No two people can possess it at the same time.").
18 David & Foray, supra note 2, at 38 ("[I]f Marie eats the last slice of cake in the
kitchen, that piece cannot also be consumed by Camille, whereas, both girls may read the
same novel either simultaneously or sequentially, and in so doing they will not have
rendered the story any the less available for others to enjoy.").
19 It should be noted that there is social value in nearly every idea, but the focus of this
comment is private commercial value.
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transfer exploitation rights effectively provides for efficiency in the use of
ideas and their expressions, for property rights will be allocated to those
who are prepared to pay the most for them. In doing so, "the workings of
intellectual property markets ... tend to prevent ideas from remaining in
the exclusive (secret) possession of discoverers and inventors who might be
quite uninterested in seeing their creations used to satisfy the wants and
needs of other members of society."
20
C. The Right of the IPR Owner to Determine a Price for the License or
Sale of that IPR Assists in the Efficient Use of Intellectual Property
The crux of IPR laws is to encourage creation by providing an
opportunity to profit from risky and costly innovative endeavors. In the
United States, there will always be a prospect of potentially high profit, for
"there is no violation under U.S. antitrust law for unilaterally pricing an IPR
license 'too high." ''2 1 Nevertheless, pricing an IPR higher than its worth
will inevitably deter its sale or licensure. In this light, an IPR which is
invaluable to the owner, such as a patented technology used to gain a
competitive advantage in the market, will be priced above that which any
potential buyer might pay. Although the owner has a monopoly over that
intellectual property, if he or she wishes to sell or license the right of
exploitation for a profit in an open and transparent market, however, market
mechanisms will force the price to meet demand. 22 The IPR will go to the
market participant who will pay the most for it or values it more. Besides
the case where an IPR "troll" '2 3 wishes to defensively collect IPRs so that
competitors may not obtain them, a buyer will generally have a more
valuable use for the intellectual property than the seller. Thus, efficiency is
effectuated.
D. IPR Holders are Realizing the Potential for an Open and Transparent
Market Where They Can Realize a Gain on Their Creative Investment
The recent increase in the supply of intellectual property to the
marketplace has produced an abundance of creative and innovative content
without adequate means for exploiting and applying it.2 4 The traditional
20 David & Foray, supra note 2, at 38.
21 Abbott, supra note 5.
22 The monopoly position will ensure a price somewhat above that which would be
optimal in a pure competition model, but to be sold it will have to be priced reasonably to
meet demand.
23 Perry J. Viscounty, Michael Woodrow De Vries & Eric M. Kennedy, Patent Auctions,
Emerging Trend?, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 2006, at S12 ("['Troll' is] a term sometimes used to
describe patent holding companies that do not practice the patents they hold.").
24 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Table of Issue Years and Numbers, for Selected
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channels for marketing, selling, or licensing a valuable IPR are no longer
sufficient to sustain the rapid influx and the need for transparency. Ideas
must be introduced to the market quickly, or else "the next best thing" will
usurp the market and the former idea will be stagnated and valueless.
Generally, intellectual property is introduced to the market through one-on-
one negotiations between attorneys, which are facilitated by private
connections. This process is both costly and time-consuming.25 It also
facilitates inequities in the marketplace resulting from disparities in
bargaining power.26
The values of intellectual property are rising. In fact, they are
"becoming too large to trade in a clandestine market." 27 Worldwide sales of
IPRs surged with the birth of the digital economy. Annual transactions
increased from just $10 billion in 1990 to $200 billion in 2007.28 IPR
holders are recognizing the rise in value, but more importantly, they are
recognizing the saleable nature of the IPR. "[I]ndividual IP rights are
increasingly viewed as commodities in their own right and not merely as
business tools in the hands of specific enterprises." 29 This position has
cultivated a growing need for transparency in the marketplace, where IPR
holders, or potential sellers, can find potential buyers. Moreover,
transparency is needed to standardize the valuation of IPRs, and to create an
arena for open information that will lead to completely informed decisions.
Both old and new IPR holders have a vested interest in the
development of a transparent marketplace. Creators generally lack the
experience, know-how, and business sense to market their IPR. "[M]ost
independent inventors flounder when it comes to getting a patent into the
hands of the right investor or manufacturer." 30 If they have the resources,
they will pay an attorney to do this for them. A corporeal IPR market will
open new channels for the creator to realize a gain on his creative
investment by bringing visibility to an otherwise concealed marketplace.
Corporations and entities that boast large intellectual property
catalogues experience hefty costs in managing and maintaining such
Document Types Issued Since 1836, http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/issuyear.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008).
25 Kevin J. O'Brien, Licenses, Once Protected, Are Now Up for Auction, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., May 13, 2007, at 12, available at http://iht.com/articles/2007/05/13/business/ip14.php
("Many sellers are hoping for a new sales channel for IP, which is costly to market through
the traditional method of hiring patent attorneys to negotiate with potential buyers.").
26 See id. ("Smaller sellers, who often lack the clout to obtain large IP royalty fees in
negotiations with corporations, are ... hoping for better profits [through an IP auction].").
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 IPKat, Making a Bid for Monopoly Power, http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2007/06/
making-bid-for-monopoly-power-ip.html (June 3, 2007).
30 Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1999, at C7.
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catalogues.3 1 Meanwhile, many patents might serve useful functions in
other market sectors or industries. 32 A transparent market that facilitates
cross-market licensing and sales of IPRs would be a lucrative alternative to
maintaining patents that are not still highly valued by these entities.
For these reasons, a market is soon to develop. IPR holders will no
longer be funneled through traditional outlets, where IPR sales are
"primarily accomplished through private transactions, brought about by a
loose network of [IP] professionals and innovators who [rely] primarily on
private introductions and targeted pitches to put deals together." 33 Instead, a
"more liquid, more public, and more robust market" for IPRs will continue
to emerge. 34
II. THE NEW MARKET: IP AUCTIONS AND BEYOND
Market participants have followed the lead of various entrepreneurial
companies in creating the new trend: IPR auctions. While the statistical
success of these auctions has not been overwhelming, their lasting effect on
the market will be great.
A. IP Auctions Have Brought Needed Transparency to the Market
In April of 2006, Chicago-based intellectual property management
company Ocean Tomo hosted the world's first live IPR auction in San
Francisco.35 The event recorded sales of almost $3 million.36 Since the San
Francisco auction, Ocean Tomo has hosted auctions in Chicago and New
York, and they plan to organize further auctions in chosen U.S. cities. 37
In May of 2007, one year after the Ocean Tomo auction, the first
European auction was held in Munich by IP Auctions, a Hamburg company
comprised of European patent lawyers, intellectual property assessors and
private investors. 38 A few weeks later, Ocean Tomo hosted their first
European auction in London. However, nearly two-thirds of the "lots"
31 O'Brien, supra note 25 ("Bayer wants to cut the cost of maintaining 80,000 patents.").
32 Ann-Kristen Achleitner, Eva Nathusius, & Stephanie Schraml, Quantitative Valuation
of Platform Technology Based Intangibles Companies 4 (Ctr. for Entrepreneurial and Fin.
Studies, Working Paper No. 2007-02, 2007), available at http://www.cefs.de/files/200702-
cefs-wp.pdf ("Contrary to technologies with a single application, platform technologies can
serve as cross-market technologies.").
33 Viscounty et al., supra note 23.
34 Id.
35 O'Brien, supra note 25.
36 Viscounty et al., supra note 23.
37 See Ocean Tomo Auctions, Spring & Summer 2009 IP Auctions, http://www.ocean-
tomo.com/auctions.html (last visited Jan 11, 2009).
38 O'Brien, supra note 25.
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offered for sale went unsold.3
9
Poor sales percentages at most of the auctions to date have caused
many critics to deem the auctions to be failures. The day after the San
Francisco auction, a Wall Street journal headline read "Public Auction for
Patents Fails to Sway Buyers." 40 Another source declared that the "Ocean
Tomo Patent Auction Falls Flat." 41 Still, many commend the concept and
are quick to qualify its shortfalls as conditions of a developing market.42
While the auctions "may not ... [live] up to some expectations, the strong
interest in the concept of public patent auctions ... signals an emerging
trend toward a more liquid, more public and more robust market for
patents." 43 Importantly, "the trend is likely to continue." 44
The concept of auctioning intellectual property is not completely
novel, however. Public auctions have been held for IPRs in the context of
bankruptcy or dissolution of a business. 45 Furthermore, private auctions
have been held for particular IPRs, in which the seller or a representative
invites a selected group of potential buyers to bid on the IPR.46 Still, truly
public mass-IPR auctions of the magnitude of that which Ocean Tomo has
organized is a new model. It will also have the largest effect on the
emerging market for IPRs.
The real success exhibited by these auctions is the ability to bring
sellers and buyers to a common public forum, providing visibility to the
marketplace. The transaction costs associated with finding potential buyers
and negotiating deals are erased, at least for a short time. 47
An advantage for the seller, the unique public auction model provides
a sense of urgency to the transaction. 48 Effectively, it shifts the burden from
the seller to the buyer. By providing a visible public platform on which an
IPR may be offered for sale, the IPR becomes available to competitors who
39 Impact, IP Auction Sets New Record Price, http://impact.freethcartwright.com/
2007/06/ipauction_sets.html (June 4, 2007, 16:42).
40 Don Clark, Public Auction for Patents Fails to Sway Buyers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7,
2006, at A 11.
41 Posting of Lawrence B. Ebert to IPBIZ, http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2006_04 01-
archive, html (April 30, 2006, 10:03).
42 Impact, supra note 39 ("[T]he market is still developing and the fact that almost two-
thirds of the lots went unsold and most of those that did sell went for less than expected is an
indication of that fact.").




47 See O'Brien, supra note 25 ("For a decade, Webasto, based in the Munich suburb of
Stockdorf, has spent millions negotiating the sale of licenses for its vehicle solar panels to
automakers like Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, Opel, Volkswagen and Audi.").
48 Id. (quoting Andrew Ramer, president of Ocean Tomo Auctions, saying "[t]he auction
is a unique platform; it creates a sense of urgency ....").
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL
may obtain the valuable asset by offering a higher bid. In the context of
direct competitor auction-participants, the right of exclusive exploitation
effectively increases the value of the IPR, and therefore increases the sale
price to the seller.
The auction model provides benefits for potential buyers as well.
Companies will not have to worry about the sale of valuable patents in its
respective market to competitors without its knowledge. In this light,
transparency is just as important to buyers. Furthermore, prices for IPRs
will become public information. This should help standardize intellectual
property valuations and ensure that buyers will pay a market price.
Consider the following:
With the typical market transaction shrouded in secrecy, potential
buyers often are unaware of the intellectual property acquisition
opportunities in the marketplace, and consequently are unable to act to
pursue them. This often results in their leaming about IP which was for
sale only after receipt of a licensing or notice letter. This has rendered,
and will continue to render, companies susceptible to unforeseeable
actions. Conversely, the public nature of the auction enables companies
with a licensing interest, or interest in pursuing the development of new
technologies and/or portfolio diversification, equal opportunity to know
of and pursue opportunities. By making the forum for IP transactions
public, the auction provides the market with intelligence of what is
available for acquisition as well as assuring that the buyer will pay a
true market price for IP assets.49
For this reason, "there are sure to be more live, public patent auctions
in the near future." 50
B. The Next Step: Entrepreneurs Attempt to Take the IPR Market Online
The public auction model is quite new, and it is just now starting to
find success. 5 1 Nevertheless, entrepreneurs have experimented with the
online forum. While business models differ, they all attempt to shape the
market for IPRs while creating visibility for buyers and sellers.
Several start-up companies have attempted to facilitate transactions by
creating a central online database of IPRs offered for sale by inventors. 52
49 Ocean Tomo Auctions, About Page, http://www.oceantomo/auctions-about.html (last
visited Jan 11, 2009) [hereinafter About Ocean Tomo].
50 Viscounty et al., supra note 23.
51 The latest Ocean Tomo Auction in Chicago on October 24 and 25, 2007, saw a
transaction success rate of fifty-one percent, recording over $11 million in sales. See Erin
Coe, Ocean Tomo Gains Ground With Patent Auction, LAW360, October 31, 2007, http://ip.
law360.com/registrations/user-registration?article-id=38977.
52 See Free Patent Auction, Free Patent Auction Lists Patented Inventions Available for
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Generally, these companies assist the transaction by providing seller contact
information for potential buyers that register with the site. 53 Some of them
provide for the actual transaction to take place over the internet.5 4 Other
sites offer much more than just a forum for the exchange of IPRs. These
companies provide complete intellectual property portfolio management
consulting services, 55 as well as an online exchange of intellectual
property. 56 Finally, other companies offer online intellectual property
valuation services to the exchange forums, including to Ocean Tomo's live
public auctions.
57
The online birth of an IPR market created a stir.58 Perhaps ahead of its
time, the market was still developing, and first movers struggled to control
the susceptible features of trading IPRs. Those that initiated the movement
did not fully consider crucial aspects of a successful IPR market, such as
complete information, 59 buyer and seller anonymity, 60 due diligence, 6 1 and
standardized intellectual property valuation. In order to successfully
commercialize IPRs, a viable and advantageous marketplace for both
buyers and sellers must take into account these important features.
Sale or License, http://www.freepatentauction.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2008); see also
IPmenu, http://www.ipmenu.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
53 See Free Patent Auction, supra note 52.
54 See Taeus, http://www.taeus.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); See also Yet2.com,
Using This Site, http://www.yet2.com/app/about/usingsite (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
Occasionally, a patent has been sold on the online auction megastore, such as U.S. Patent
No. 5,806,094, entitled "Light Weight Upper Torso Outer Garment Assembly For Use By a
Child." See Viscounty et al., supra note 23.
55 See About Ocean Tomo, supra note 49.
56 See Yet2.com, supra note 54.
57 See PatentCAFE, http:/www/patentcafe.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2008); see also
Taeus, supra note 54.
58 Chartrand, supra note 30.
59 Id. (writing about an online patent exchange that was introduced in 1998, but
currently is not functioning). "The descriptions were so brief as to be of little use to an
interested buyer: A patent for a wireless color camera, for example, was described only as a
'low-cost wireless color camera, utilizing new CMOS camera technology.' There was no
definition of CMOS technology for the uninitiated, and no further explanation of why this
particular camera was innovative enough to win a patent and pique the interest of investors.
[A random look at other listings found that they all] skimped on detail." Id.
60 Id. ("A lot of inventors are very, very cautious about going online ... .
61 See Kevin O'Brien, Technology Auction Falters in Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May
21, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/21/news/ip.php ("[O]rganizers did not give
buyers enough time to evaluate purchases of complex manufacturing licenses. Prospective
purchasers had six weeks to study the intellectual property offered and perform 'due
diligence' of legal and financial checks.").
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111. PRACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS
The practicability of a completely fluent IPR market will incur
obstacles that other commoditized markets do not. Specifically, (1)
transparency must be effectuated without compromising any participants'
preferred anonymity or confidentiality, (2) buyers must be given adequate
opportunity for necessary due diligence, and therefore dealings may require
sufficient prior notice and the disclosure of complete information, and (3)
intellectual property must be accurately valued despite its legal requirement
that it be novel and unique. Despite these hindrances, a healthy market is
not only viable, but it is advantageous for the intellectual property
community and a knowledge-based economy.
A. Transparency Can Be Effectuated Without Compromising Anonymity
and Confidentiality Considerations
Reluctance to enter into a transparent forum has somewhat slowed the
development of the IPR market. The founder of patentauctions.com,
inventor Brian Donzis, realized quickly that "[a] lot of inventors are very,
very cautious about going online." 62 This is understandably so, for
publishing details of a patent may compromise the patent's ingenuity and
provoke others to reproduce the idea before it has entered the market. Buyer
anonymity is also important in the intellectual property context. Although
corporate sellers may have to risk selling to a competitor, buyers of
intangible assets may wish to remain anonymous so that those assets may
become a competitive advantage not known by its competitors.
Furthermore, involvement in intellectual property transactions and auctions
could be susceptible to subsequent litigation over intellectual property
misappropriation or in which intellectual property must be valued. For this
reason, companies facilitating IPR exchanges must be very conscientious of
buyer anonymity. 63 Still, market transparency must be achieved, and
complete information must be available to minimize risk.
Transparency may be achieved in various ways, depending on the
medium. The effectual instrument will be the central body hosting the
auction or transaction. This neutral facilitating body must act as a redactor
of sensitive information while still making critical information available. In
the live auction setting, anonymous bidding may take place by neutral
agents or representatives, such as proxies appointed by the principal bidder
and supplied by the central organizer. It is important that "[s]uccessful
[b]idders . . . be identified by paddle number only," or by some other
62 Chartrand, supra note 30.
63 See About Ocean Tomo, supra note 49.
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anonymous means. 64  Furthermore, due diligence procedures and
communications between the buyer and seller may be facilitated through a
medium, so that parties to the transaction may remain anonymous. 6 5 A
buyer may contact the central body first, and the central body would then
relay any communications to the seller, who then may communicate with
the buyer directly or through the central body. In the online transaction or
auction setting, anonymity may be more easily effectuated through the use
of anonymous usernames and!or email addresses. 66 An online secure data
library containing all relevant information concerning a listed IPR may be
set up for buyers to conduct their due diligence. Ocean Tomo practices both
of these strategies for its live auctions. 67 Finally, to instill seller and buyer
confidence, agreements may be offered, and should be entered into as a
condition of market participation, promising not to use any party's
involvement in an exchange or auction to enforce an IPR in any subsequent
action. 6
8
Using such mechanisms, complete information about the IPR for sale
may be disclosed in a public forum, while sensitive information about the
IPR holder or potential buyer may be kept confidential. Thus, market
transparency can be achieved without compromising important anonymity
concerns that might otherwise make participants reluctant to enter the
market.
B. Proper Due Diligence Can Be Facilitated by Timely and Adequate
Notice, and Through Central Due Diligence Libraries
In the wake of recent U.S. patent litigation, effective worldwide IPR
due diligence is more important than ever. In NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd.,69 patents originally issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office to a Canadian firm, Research in Motion, Ltd., were held to infringe
prior patents held by a U.S. firm, NTP, Inc. The result cost the infringing
firm $612.5 million. 70 Commentators have criticized the U.S. Patent and
64 See Ocean Tomo Auctions, Conditions of Sale, http://www.oceantomo.com/auc-
tions summer09 cos.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Conditions of Sale].
65 Ocean Tomo Auctions, Due Diligence, http://www.oceantomo.com/auctions due
diligence.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Due Diligence].
66 For example, individuals who interact with one another on Yet2.com are able to list
their technology anonymously rather than maintain anonymity through a third-party. See
Yet2.com, Using This Site, supra note 54.
67 Due Diligence, supra note 65.
68 Id.
69 418 F.3d 1282, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
70 See Settlement Ends Blackberry Case, BBC NEWS, Mar. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/business/4773006.stm.
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Trademark Office (USPTO) for issuing low quality patents. 7 1 Indeed, the
decision "highlights the importance of owning high quality patents, or
conversely, the risks associated with poor quality patents that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office can later invalidate ... and along with losing
patent validity, the patent owner also loses their entire patent investment."
72
Due diligence is onerous in the IPR context because of the dynamic
faculties of intellectual property, some of which may cause an investment in
an IPR to prove worthless. Besides reviewing all pertinent information
regarding the creation, registration, assignment, or license of the intellectual
property, a buyer should seek review of any cease and desist or demand
letters, any threatened or pending litigation, any settlement agreements, and
any security interests or security agreements concerning the intellectual
property.73 This list is not exclusive.
In a commoditized IPR market, buyers must be given adequate time to
conduct due diligence. Without adequate time, buyers will be hesitant to
make risky investments, and the market will not develop. The insignificant
sales at the first European auction in Munich in 2007 were attributed to the
lack of time allotted for bidder due diligence. 74 Manfred Petri, the general
agent for IP Auctions, the firm that organized the event, stated that six
weeks "simply wasn't enough time," and that "buyers need at least three
months to do the complex legal checking to make informed bids."
75
While the due diligence process may have stymied the success of the
Munich auction, six weeks should be adequate time if sufficient notice is
achieved and complete information is readily available to potential buyers
in a central library. Due diligence takes time because of difficulties in
collecting and organizing all of the relevant information from various
sources. In a fluid IPR market, it is the seller's responsibility to produce this
information, and the facilitating body's responsibility to organize it in a
central library. Once the information is gathered and organized, the review
process should not take more than six weeks.
The lack of sales in the Munich auction is more appropriately
attributed to inadequate notice, something that should fix itself as the
71 See Press Release, PatentCafe, Artificial Intelligence Used for Patent Auction Due
Diligence; Evaluation Reports for April 5-6 Auction Gauge Patent Quality (Mar. 16, 2006),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/03/prweb35942 l.htm.
72 Id.
73 Rauer L. Meyer, Intellectual Property Due Diligence: A Must When Assets are
Transferred, Aug. 5, 2002, http://www.constructionweblinks.comResources/lndustry_
ReportssNewsletters/Aug_5 2002/IP due dilligence.htm.
74 European Intellectual Property Auction Generates Poor Sales, EU AUCTION INFO,
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market for IPRs, and specifically for IPR auctions, gains popularity and
visibility. Growing awareness of the potential for turning IPRs into cash
through public forums such as live IPR auctions and online exchanges will
breed adequate notice. Potential buyers will watch the market and remain
informed. Therefore, as the market develops, so long as complete
information is available in an accessible centralized library, such as that
utilized by Ocean Tomo, 76 at least four to six weeks prior to an auction or
transaction, due diligence can be sufficiently effectuated.
C. A Transparent Market Will Help Standardize IPR Values by Creating a
Market Price Through Increased Comparability
Intellectual Property valuation has proven to be an unsolvable enigma
for IPR market participants. Owners "rely on software tools or third party
services to quantify a [IPRs] value, and accept at face-value a single 'score',
or a ($) dollar value analysis that the software or service computes." 77 The
services combine and evaluate interactive indicators of IPR value. 78 Though
insightful, the services are not accurate at predicting a sale price for IPRs.
At Ocean Tomo's June 2007 auction in London, a company called TAEUS
was exhibiting its IPR valuation service.7 9 It "rate[d]" the listed IPRs for
sale, "giving each a score of between 2.4 at the lowest and 3.5 at the
highest." 80 One patent that sold for £2.85 million had a score of 2.5, but
another patent that sold for £50,000 had a score of 2.8.81
Reliance on these separate services will continue "until a solution is
provided by which [holders] can in fact intelligently assess the disparate
legal, commercial and technical attributes of a patent." 82 While each of
these attributes will demonstrate a different value depending on the IPR, all
three must be considered interactively for an accurate valuation. Still, in a
transparent marketplace, market mechanisms will influence the price that is
paid for an IPR, despite its estimated value. As one critic of valuation
services has proclaimed, "[t]he difficulty with valuing IPR is the same as
valuing a company-at the end of the day you can make estimates but the
76 Conditions of Sale, supra note 64 ("[Ocean Tomo] has requested each Seller to
provide documents and related information relevant to each of Seller's Lots that, in Seller's
view, are appropriate for due diligence by Bidder. Such documents and information received
by OT from Seller [are] made available in the Data Rooms.").
77 Andy Gibbs, PatentCafe's New Online Tools Analyze Patent Value, IP FRONTNE,
June 15, 2005, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=423 I &deptid=8.
78 See id.
79 Impact, supra note 39.
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 Gibbs, supra note 77.
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best test of value is what someone will pay." 83
In a transaction involving the exchange of an IPR, both the potential
investor and the IPR holder will value the IPR differently. The investor will
assess the current value of the future financial return the IPR could provide,
probably amortized over a given term, and discounted for risk and
inflation. 84 In short, this is the current value of the future royalty stream. 85
The holder will value the IPR by what the market will pay for it. In the
context of privately negotiated transactions, "this means there is no
automatic ceiling on the price and negotiations will determine the level."
86
However, in an open market where public auctions and online exchanges
will provide transparency to the marketplace, transaction participants will
become more informed, and market mechanisms will influence a market
price for IPRs that will reduce reliance on bargaining power and IPR
valuation services. 87 Effectively, prices paid for IPRs will become public
information, a useful tool that parties to IPR transactions have not yet
enjoyed. Such publicity will assist in comparative analysis, and competitive
market forces will help stabilize otherwise arbitrary prices for IPRs.
Eventually, buyers will pay a market price. 88
Standardizing IPR valuations through market mechanisms will only
occur if a robust market develops. In 2000, an expert at the WIPO Asian
Regional Forum on the Intellectual Property Strategy for the Promotion of
Innovative and Inventive Activities asserted this evident position:
[A] market valuation of assets is the most straightforward and
acceptable approach as it results from the judgment of a buyer and
seller on what is a fair value. For comparable market valuations to be
valid there must be an active market that is trading comparable assets.
This occurs in trading common assets like motor vehicles and houses.
If these market conditions do not exist, finding reasonable comparisons
83 Impact, supra note 39.
84 INT'L BUREAU OF WIPO, SEMINAR ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1998), available at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/
valuation docs/arb lic cai 98 4.pdf.
85 JOHN TURNER, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS; VALUATION
TECHNIQUES: PARAMETERS, METHODOLOGIES AND LIMITATIONS (2000), available at http:/I
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/valuationdocs/inn ddk_05xax.pdf.
86 INT'L BUREAU OF WIPO, supra note 84.
87 IPKat, supra note 29 ("[T]o the extent that the prices paid for individual lots are
known and publicized, it will be far easier for licensors, licensees, purchasers, vendors,
lenders, infringers and everyone else to develop an intuitive sense of how much an IP right is
worth ...").
88 About Ocean Tomo, supra note 49 ("By making the forum for IP transactions public,
the auction provides the market with intelligence of what is available for acquisition as well
as assuring that the buyer will pay a true market price for IP assets.").
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becomes more subjective and hence, valuations become less reliable. 8 9
The expert followed with a note on the state of the IPR market in
2000: "[I]n the case of trading IP assets themselves, the market is not
normally sufficiently active, nor is there sufficient public information about
details such as price and IP characteristics, to allow reliable
comparisons." 90 In the last six years, however, companies such as Ocean
Tomo,91 Yet2,9 2 and IP Auctions,9 3 have entered the IPR market as
facilitators of auctions and other IPR transactions. Their presence has
initiated a growing recognition of the potential for commercializing and
commoditizing IPRs, and has led to the inception of a market where
transparent comparability will soon develop real market prices. While
experts "[doubt] that the IP valuation industry is about to be put out of
business," they advise observers to "keep an eye on what the institutional
investors are doing: once the pensions funds are bidding, we'll know that IP
auctions have come of age."
94
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS, TRIPS, AND THE NEED
FOR A SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
A transparent market of the kind that is soon to unfold will have
international implications of no small significance. Because market prices
will be fundamentally correlated with the amount of protection an IPR will
be given in respective countries around the world, achieving international
protection standards is important. The TRIPS, 9 5 which came into effect
through the framework of the WTO on January 1, 1995, is the most
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property. It provides a
floor for protection that signatory members must implement nationally and
presents the opportunity for such members to require more protection than
this floor. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1 provides the following:
"Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement ... "96
89 TURNER, supra note 85, at 9.
90 Id.
91 About Ocean Tomo, supra note 49.
92 See Yet2.com, supra note 54.
93 IP Auctions, http://www.ipauctions.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
94 IPKat, supra note 29.
95 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
96 Id. art. 1, § 1, at 1198.
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL
Therefore, TRIPS addresses the need for minimal protection
standards. TRIPS was designed, however, to provide protection for IPRs in
international trade with regard to the goods and products that encompass
those IPRs. It does not contemplate a commoditized international
marketplace for IPRs themselves. 9 7 Such a marketplace will generate
antitrust, ethical, and disclosure problems that will also need a foundation
for international standardization that does not currently exist.
A. Antitrust and Restraint-of- Trade Implications of a Robust IPR Market
Are Not Adequately Covered by TRIPS
It is easy to envision how an open IPR market might be abused to
effectuate circumstances that will restrain competition and trade. Monopoly
powers are conferred with the ownership of IPRs. 9 8 An open market for
IPRs provides the ability to buy monopoly powers without limit, and a
single person or entity may have the means and wherewithal to corner a
market through such purchases.
Exploiting the market in this regard is even more dangerous in certain
developing countries without adequate antitrust laws. The market would
allow entities in those countries to gain monopoly positions where they
could not be gained before due to insufficient resources for developing new
technologies. In other words, a transparent and fluent IPR market would
allow developing countries to play "catch-up" faster, but without adequate
legal means to regulate such development. As one professor has explained,
"Within some of the advanced industrialized countries there are effective
competition policies, which work to mitigate the risks that results from the
abuse of monopoly power associated with [an IPR]. But most countries do
not have comparably effective anti-trust policies .... ,99
TRIPS only considers anticompetitive practices in the intellectual
property context with minimal weight, setting forth the following in Article
40: "Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in
their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse
97 In Articles 3 and 4, with regard to national and most favored nation treatment for the
protection of IPRs, TRIPS defines "protection" as involving matters pertaining to the
"availability" and "acquisition" of IPRs, TRIPS, supra note 95, art. 3-4, at 322 n.3, and
Article 62 mentions that members "may require . .. compliance with reasonable procedures
and formalities," TRIPS, supra note 95, art. 62, § 1, at 1220, pertaining to the acquisition of
IPRs. This minimal consideration of the exchange of IPRs is inadequate to support a robust
market for reasons that will be explained later in this article.
98 See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 12.
99 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 308, 314 (Inge Kaul et al.
eds., 1999).
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effect on competition in the relevant market."
100
While "licensing practices" and "conditions" may be broadly
interpreted language, they surely do not contemplate the widespread
possibilities for abuse in a commoditized market for IPRs. This position is
given further support by the examples of anticompetitive practices offered
by the authors in Article 40: "exclusive grantback conditions, conditions
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing."' 1 Even
more significantly, Article 40 only sets forth that members "may adopt...
measures to prevent or control such practices," and does not require some
minimum standard as it does with IPR protection. 10 2 Without such a
minimum standard, entities in those countries without effective antitrust
policies may abuse the market for IPRs. Not only might this be harmful for
industries and consumers in those countries, but sellers might be dissuaded
from entering the market for fear of selling to an IPR "troll," resulting in a
restraint of trade. Therefore, in anticipation of a robust international IPR
market, a supplemental multilateral agreement is needed that requires
certain antitrust policy standards for members.
B. Procedural and Administrative Standards Must Be Required
A fluid international market for IPRs will be slow to develop without
international standards for administrative and procedural aspects of IPR
acquisitions. Disparities will burden cross-border sales, and sellers and
buyers will dispute administrative responsibilities, including devices such
as international trade certifications and registering transfers of IPRs in
respective government offices.
Article 62 of TRIPS only provides that "[m]embers may require, as a
condition of the acquisition . .. of . . . intellectual property rights . ..
compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities."10 3 Although
TRIPS was authored at a time when a robust market for IPRs had not been
established, standards for procedures and formalities associated with the
acquisition of IPRs need to be introduced and required today. The option to
adopt such compliance measures will only slow the development of the
beneficial market, for resources will continue to be expended to evaluate the
disparities in transaction formalities. This will inevitably deter market
participation. Therefore, the developing international IPR market needs a
supplemental multilateral agreement that requires certain procedural and
administrative standards associated with the acquisition of IPRs.
100 TRIPS, supra note 95, art. 40, § 2.
101 Id.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 TRIPS, supra note 95, art. 62, § 1 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
It is certainly a new dawn, a new day, and a new life for intellectual
property holders, and they should all be feeling good about it. The
government-granted rights encompassed in an idea allow the owner of that
idea to capitalize on an investment. Until recently, turning IPRs into cash
was only effectuated through private negotiations and closed circles,
consuming an owner's time and money. A new market for IPRs, however,
has been initiated with the public IPR auction setting, a business model that
is here to stay. The new market, once fully developed, will provide
transparency, liquidity, and access that did not exist through traditional
outlets. It will win favor with both sellers and buyers of IPRs. Furthermore,
this market will instill an everlasting incentive to create by providing a
public forum with more opportunities for turning creative investment into
profit.
The challenges this market faces are many. Specifically, (1)
transparency must be effectuated without compromising any participants'
preferred anonymity or confidentiality, (2) buyers must be given adequate
opportunity for necessary due diligence, and therefore dealings may require
sufficient prior notice and the disclosure of complete information, and (3)
intellectual property must be accurately valued despite its legal requirement
that it be novel and unique. These issues can be solved.
Anonymity and confidentiality considerations can be neutralized if a
facilitating body acts as a redactor of sensitive information while still
making critical information available. The body must play the role of a
switchboard, relaying communications between sellers and buyers while
providing a centralized and accessible library for due diligence.
Due diligence can be effectively completed if sellers are responsible
for disclosing information to the facilitating body, who must set up an
accessible library in which buyers can review the information
anonymously. This is easily done online in a secure data room using
usernames and passwords. Finally, sufficient notice will breed itself once
the market is developed, for the burden will shift to the buyers to stay
abreast of the market and remain knowledgeable about what is being
offered, lest they miss out on something valuable that a competitor might
obtain.
IP valuation services will become less relied on as the market becomes
developed. The presence of companies such as Ocean Tomo has initiated a
growing recognition of the potential for commercializing and
commoditizing IPRs, and this has led to the inception of a market where
transparent comparability will soon develop real market prices. Buyer
confidence will rise once comparability becomes practicable, for they will
gain assurance that they are paying what the market would pay, and not
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what their attorney negotiated in a private deal based on arbitrary
estimations, as is done currently.
Finally, a supplementary multilateral international agreement needs to
be implemented, requiring minimum standards for antitrust protection, as
well as for procedural and administrative duties associated with the
acquisition of IPRs. TRIPS was authored without contemplating a robust
IPR market in which monopoly powers can be purchased and daily cross-
border transactions will involve valuable intangible assets. The TRIPS
Council will need to convene at some point in the near future to consider
the international implications of the transparent, liquid, and robust IPR
market that will soon develop.
